HEROIC HELPERS : What factors and thinking processes lead people (both groups and individuals) to intervene in the face of injustice?

With your partners, you will review your sections of the assigned articles and answer the following questions in this shared Google Document.

1) Locate your assigned assigned section in the article packet and review it carefully individually. Highlight elements of your concept(s) that seem most important.

2) Describe the factors and motivations explored in your section in your own words.

3) Why do you think this factor motivates some people to intervene in the face of injustice?

4) What connections can you see to *Kite Runner* and *Schindler's List*? Connection to historical events?

5) Find a visual image or symbol online that illustrates your section. Paste it into the document, and be ready to explain it to the class.

BASIC MOTIVES UNDERLYING PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR: WHY DO PEOPLE HELP?

• **Prosocial behavior** is any act performed with the goal of benefiting another person.

• **Altruism** is the desire to help another person even if it involves some personal cost to the helper.

• Two basic questions that people have asked are whether helping is an inborn tendency or one that must be taught, and whether people ever help without receiving some benefit in return.

A. Evolutionary Psychology: Instincts and Genes

• **Evolutionary psychology** is the attempt to explain social behavior in terms of genetic factors that evolved over time according to the principles of natural selection.

• Darwin recognized that altruistic behavior posed a problem for his theory: if an organism acts altruistically, it may decrease its own likelihood of surviving to pass on its genes.

1. Kin Selection

• **Kin selection** is the idea that behaviors that help a genetic relative are favored by natural selection. Helping a kin member may decrease one's own probability for survival/passing on one's genes, but kin share the same genes, so saving a kin member may pass on one's own genes. Self-reports from people (Burnstein, Crandall, & Kitayama, 1994), and anecdotal evidence from real emergencies (Sime, 1983) show that organisms help more the more closely another is related to them.

2. The Reciprocity Norm

• The **norm of reciprocity** is the expectation that helping others will increase the likelihood that they will help us in the future. Sociobiologists suggest that, as humans were evolving, those who were the most likely to survive would be those who developed an understanding with the neighbors based on this norm; they would have been more likely to survive than either completely competitive or completely cooperative people.

Part 1

3. Learning Social Norms

• Simon (1990) suggests that those who are the best learners of societal norms have a competitive advantage. Thus people are genetically programmed to learn social norms and one of these norms is altruism.

• The claims of evolutionary psychologists are still being debated. For example, the theory has difficulty explaining why complete strangers sometimes help each other.

B. Social Exchange: The Costs and Rewards of Helping

• *Social exchange theory* argues that much of what we do stems from the desire to maximize our rewards and minimize our costs. Like evolutionary psychology, it is a theory based on self-interest; unlike it, it assumes that self-interest has no genetic basis.

• Helping can be rewarding in three ways: it can increase the probability that someone will help us in return in the future; it can relieve the personal distress of the bystander; and it can gain us social approval and increased self-worth.

• Helping can also be costly; thus it decreases when costs are high. Social exchange theory presumes that people help only when the rewards outweigh the costs. Thus social exchange theory presumes that there is no pure altruism.

C. Empathy and Altruism: The Pure Motive for Helping

• Batson is the strongest proponent of the idea that people often help purely out of the goodness of their hearts. He argues that pure altruism is most likely to come into play when we experience **empathy** for the person in need; that is, when we are able to experience events and emotions the way that that person experiences them.
Batson's **empathy-altruism hypothesis** states that when we feel empathy for a person, we will attempt to help purely for altruistic reasons, that is, regardless of what we have to gain. If we do not feel empathy, then social exchange concerns will come into play (see Figure 11–1).

• In a study by Toi and Batson, (1982), students listened to a taped interview with a student who had ostensibly broken both legs in an accident and was behind in classes. Two factors were manipulated: empathetic vs. non-empathetic set, manipulated by instructions given to Ss; and the costs of helping, manipulated by whether or not the injured student was expected to be seen every day once she returned to class. The dependent variable was whether Ss responded to a request to help the injured student catch up in class. As the empathy-altruism hypothesis predicted, people in the high empathy condition helped regardless of cost, while those in the low empathy condition helped only if the cost of not helping was high (Figure 11–2).

• The empathy-altruism hypothesis has been much debated, with some researchers arguing that empathy increases the cost of not helping and thus increases the likelihood of helping because it lowers people's distress at seeing someone they care about suffer.

PERSONAL QUALITIES AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR: WHY DO SOME PEOPLE HELP MORE THAN OTHERS?

A. Individual Differences: The Altruistic Personality

• An **altruistic personality** consists of the qualities that cause an individual to help others in a wide variety of situations.

• It turns out that there is little evidence of consistency in altruism; for example, Hartshorne and May (1929) found only a .23 correlation between different kinds of helping behaviors in children, and several studies have found that those who scored high on a personality test of altruism were not much more likely to help than those who scored low. People's personality is clearly not the only determinant of helping. Instead, it seems to be that different kinds of people are likely to help in different situations.

B. Gender Differences in Prosocial Behavior

Part 2

• Eagly and Crowley (1986) did a meta-analysis and found that men are more likely to help in chivalrous, heroic ways, and women are more likely to help in nurturant ways involving long-term commitment.

C. Cultural Differences in Prosocial Behavior

• It might seem as though people with an *interdependent view of the self*, who come from collectivist cultures, would be more likely to help a person in need. However, people everywhere are less likely to help a member of an **out-group**, a group with which the person does not identify, than a member of an **in-group**, the group with which the person identifies and feels he or she is a member. Cultural factors come into play in determining how strongly people draw the line between in-groups and out-groups. People in collectivist cultures may draw a firmer line between in-groups and out-groups and be more likely to help in-group members and less likely to help out-group members, than people from individualistic cultures, who have an *independent view of the self.*

• Simpatía in Latino and Hispanic cultures refers to a range of friendly social and emotional traits. Levine et al. (2000) found that people in cultures that value simpatía were more likely to help in a variety of nonemergency helping situations (Table 11-1).

D. The Effects of Mood on Prosocial Behavior

• One reason that personality alone cannot determine helping is that helping depends on a person's current mood.

1. Effects of Positive Moods: Feel Good, Do Good

• People who are in a good mood are more likely to help. For example, Isen and Levin (1972) did a study in a shopping mall where Ss either found or did not find a dime in a phone booth. As the person emerged from the booth, a confederate walked by and dropped a sheaf of papers; 84% of those who found the dime helped, compared with 4% of those who did not find the dime.

• North, Tarrang, & Hargreaves (2004) found that people are more likely to help others when in a good mood for a number of other reasons, including doing well on a test, receiving a gift, thinking happy thoughts, and listening to pleasant music.

• Good moods can increase helping for three reasons: (1) good moods make us interpret events in a sympathetic way; (2) helping another prolongs the good mood, whereas not helping deflates it; (3) good moods increase self-attention, and this in turn leads us to be more likely to behave according to our values and beliefs (which tend to favor altruism).

2. Negative-State Relief: Feel Bad, Do Good

• When people feel guilty, they are more likely to help. For example, Harris et al. (1975) found that churchgoers were more likely to donate money before, rather than after, confession (while still feeling guilty as opposed to after feeling their guilt absolved).

• Sadness will lead to helping under certain conditions. Cialdini's **negative-state relief hypothesis** says that people help in order to alleviate their own sadness and distress; it exemplifies a social exchange approach. According to this theory, people in a sad or distressed mood will be more likely to help but in a way unrelated to the cause of the bad mood.

SITUATIONAL DETERMINANTS OF PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR: WHEN WILL PEOPLE HELP?

A. Environment: Rural versus Urban

• People in rural areas are more helpful. This effect holds over a wide variety of ways of helping and in many countries. One explanation is that people from rural settings are brought up to be more neighborly and more likely to trust strangers. An alternative hypothesis, posted by Milgram, is the **urban-overload hypothesis**, the idea that people living in cities are likely to keep to themselves in order to avoid being overloaded by all the stimulation they receive. The evidence supports the latter hypothesis, finding that where an accident occurs matters more in influencing helping than where potential helpers were born, and that population density is a more potent determinant of helping than is population size.

B. Residential Mobility

• People who have lived in one place for a long time are more likely to engage in prosocial behaviors.

• This effect can arise quite quickly even in a one-time laboratory setting. Oishi et al. (2006) found that participants who had worked with a group member on four tasks were more likely to help a struggling group member than those who had switched to a new group after each task.

C. The Number of Bystanders: The Bystander Effect

• Latané and Darley are two social psychologists who were working in New York at the time of the Kitty Genovese murder (described in Chapter 2). They hypothesized that, paradoxically, it might have been the large number of bystanders (38) that witnessed the murder that led to a failure to help.

• In a laboratory study, participants sat in separate booths and communicated over an intercom. As they listened, one of the other participants ostensibly had a seizure. The experimenters manipulated how many other participants the subject believed there were. The more other people the S believed were present, the less likely they were to help and the slower they were to do so (Figure 11–3) (Darley & Latané, 1968). The **bystander effect** is the finding that the greater the number of bystanders who witness an emergency, the less likely any one of them is to help.

• Latané and Darley (1970) developed a step-by-step description of how people decide whether to help in an emergency (Figure 11–4). The five steps are:

1. Noticing an Event

• In order for people to help, they must notice that an emergency has occurred.

• Sometimes very trivial things, such as how much of a hurry a person is in, can prevent them from noticing someone else in trouble. Darley and Batson (1973) showed that seminary students who were in a hurry to give a sermon on campus were much less likely to help an ostensibly injured confederate groaning in a doorway than were those who were not in a hurry. They also found that helping was not predicted by personality scores or by the topic of the sermon (half were about to lecture on the parable of the Good Samaritan).

2. Interpreting an Event as an Emergency

• The next determinant of helping is whether the bystander interprets the event as an emergency. Ironically, when other bystanders are present, people are more likely to assume an emergency is something innocuous.
This **pluralistic ignorance** occurs because people look to see others' reactions (informational influence); when they see that everyone else has a blank expression, they assume there must be no danger. This was demonstrated in a study by Latané and Darley (1970) where Ss were sitting in a room when white smoke began pouring out of a vent. The more other participants there were in the room, the less likely anyone was to seek help and the longer they took to do so. For ambiguous events, then, people in groups will gain false reassurance from each other and convince each other that nothing is wrong.

3. Assuming Responsibility

• The next step that must occur if helping is to take place is for someone to take responsibility. When there are many witnesses, there is a **diffusion of responsibility**, the phenomenon whereby each bystander's sense of responsibility to help decreases as the number of witnesses increases. Everyone assumes that someone else will help, and as a result, no one does, as happened with the Kitty Genovese murder.

4. Knowing How to Help

• Even if all the previous conditions are met, a person must know what form of assistance to give. If they don't, they will be unable to help.

5. Deciding to Implement the Help

• Finally, even if you know what kind of help to give, you might decide not to intervene because you feel unqualified to help or you are too afraid of the costs to yourself.

• Markey (2000) examined helping in an Internet chat room situation; when the chat room group as a whole was asked to provide some information about finding profiles, the larger the group, the longer it took for anyone to help. However, when a specific person was addressed by name, that person helped quickly, regardless of group size.

D. The Nature of the Relationship: Communal versus Exchange Relationships

• Much research examines helping between strangers, but most helping occurs between people who know each other well.

• *Communal relationship* (see Chapter 10) are those in which people's primary concern is with the welfare of the other, whereas *exchange relationships* are governed by equity concerns. One possibility is that rewards are equally important in the two different types of relationships, but the nature of the rewards is different. Clark and Mills (1993),

however, argue that the nature of the relationship is fundamentally different, such that those in communal relationships are less concerned with rewards.

• Generally we are more helpful towards friends than strangers, and we are more likely to help a partner in a communal relationship than a partner in an exchange relationship; the exception occurs when the other is beating us in a domain that is personally important and thus threatens our self-esteem; in this case, we are more likely to help strangers than friends.

HOW CAN HELPING BE INCREASED?

• An important note is that people do not always want to be helped—if being helped means that they appear incompetent, they will often suffer in silence, even at the cost of failing at the task.

A. Increasing the Likelihood that Bystanders Will Intervene

• Simply being aware of the barriers to helping can increase people's chances of overcoming those barriers. Two recent incidents on college campuses are cited as examples. Also, Beaman et al. (1978) had students listen either to a lecture about Latané and Darley's work or to one about an unrelated topic; two weeks later, in a different context, they encountered a student lying on the floor, while a confederate lounged by, apparently unconcerned. Those who had heard the bystander intervention lecture were more likely to help.

B. Positive Psychology and Prosocial Behavior

• Martin Seligman, a prominent clinical psychologist, has brought interest to the field of positive psychology after becoming disconcerted by clinical psychology's focus upon disease rather than health. Social psychology has not concentrated solely on negative behaviors but on positive ones as well.

C. Increasing Volunteerism

• Many people engage in volunteer work; the United States has the highest rate (47%; Ting & Piliavin, 2000). However, even in the U.S., more than half the population is not engaged in volunteerism. How can the rate of volunteering be increased? Some schools and businesses require service work; however, the *overjustification effect* suggests that those who volunteer for a requirement will be less likely to see their helping as intrinsically motivated and may volunteer less in the future; research suggests that this is in fact the case. To encourage volunteerism, one must be careful to make sure that people feel that volunteering is their free choice and not an externally imposed requirement.

be that when groups have already progressed far along the continuum of destruction, it is more difficult for bystanders to exert influence.

OTHER VIEWS OF INTERGROUP CONFLICT

We do not have psychological theories of the origins of group violence to compare with this theory. There are, however, varied theories of intergroup relations and conflict. Realistic group conflict theory (LeVine & Campbell, 1972) emphasizes conflicts over scarce, tangible resources. Frustration-aggression-displacement theory (LeVine & Campbell, 1972) identifies frustration within the group as a source of scapegoating and hostility toward other groups. Psychocultural interpretation theory (Volkan, 1988) points to dispositions in groups that lead to threats to identity and fears of survival, which interfere with the resolution of ethnic conflict. Social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982; Turner, 1987) has stressed that individuals' identity is to a substantial degree a social identity, based on membership in a group. Social categorization, the classification of individuals into different categories, leads to stereotyping and discrimination. The desire for a favorable social comparison is an important motive that leads to elevation of one's group by diminishing and discriminating against others. This enhances group self-concept and individual self-esteem.

Aspects of these theories are congenial to the theory presented here, with realistic group conflict theory, which in its basic form assumes that conflict is purely over real, material resources, as well as power, without considering psychological elements, the least congenial. The present theory, which may be called *sociocultural motivation theory*, focuses on a multiplicity of interacting influences, with intense group violence as their outcome. They include cultural dispositions, life conditions, and group conflict. While life conditions and group conflict create frustration and the experience of threat, they do not directly lead to violence. The theory identifies the way groups attempt to satisfy basic needs as the starting point for the evolution of increasing violence.

While the social nature of individual identity is important, except when the role of prior devaluation or an ideology of antagonism is predominant, it is not social comparison but other motives that are regarded as central in leading a group to turn against others. The essential and unique aspects of the present theory include focus on change or evolution in individuals and groups, the potential of bystanders to influence this evolution, and the necessity to consider how a multiplicity of factors interact.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HEROIC HELPERS

In the midst of violence and passivity, some people in Germany and Nazi-occupied Europe endangered their lives to save Jews. To do so, helpers

of German origin had to distance themselves from their group. Some rescuers were marginal to their community: They had a different religious background, were new to the community, or had a parent of foreign birth (London, 1970; Tec, 1986). This perhaps enabled them to maintain an independent perspective and not join the group's increasing devaluation of Jews. Many rescuers came from families with strong moral values and held strong moral and humanitarian values themselves, with an aversion to Nazism (London, 1970; Oliner & Oliner, 1988). Many were "inclusive" and regarded people in groups other than their own as human beings to whom human considerations apply (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). Interviews with rescuers and the rescued indicate that individual rescuers were characterized by one or more of the three primary motivators that have been proposed for altruistic helping: a value of caring or "prosocial orientation" (Staub 1974, 1978, 1995), with its focus on the welfare of people and a feeling of personal responsibility to help; moral rules or principles, the focus on living up to or fulfilling the principle or rule; and empathy, the vicarious experience of others' suffering (London, 1970; Oliner & Oliner, 1988; Tec, 1986). These were often accompanied by a hatred of Nazism.

Marginality in relation to the perpetrators or to the dominant group does not mean that rescuers were disconnected from people. In the largest study to date, Sam and Pearl Oliner (1988) found that rescuers were deeply connected to their families and/or other people. They described a large proportion (52%) of rescuers as "normocentric," or norm centered, characterized by "a feeling of obligation to a special reference group with whom the actor identified and whose explicit and implicit values he feels obliged to obey." Some normocentric rescuers were guided by internalized group norms, but many followed the guidance of leaders who set a policy of rescue. Some belonged to resistance groups, church groups, or families that influenced them. In Belgium, where the queen and the government-in-exile and church leaders set the tone, most of the nation refused to cooperate with anti-Jewish policies, and the underground actively helped Jews, who as a result were highly active in helping themselves (Fein, 1979). But normocentric influence can lead people in varied directions. In Poland, some priests and resistance groups helped Jews, while other priests encouraged their communities to support the Nazi persecution of Jews, and some resistance groups killed Jews (Tec, 1986).

Many rescuers started out by helping a Jew with whom they had a past relationship. Some were asked by a Jewish friend or acquaintance to help. The personal relationship would have made it more likely that altruistic-moral motives as well as relationship-based motives would become active. Having helped someone they knew, many continued to help.

Even in ordinary times a feeling of competence is usually required for the expression of motivation in action, or even for its arousal (Ajzen, 1988; Bandura, 1989; Staub, 1978, 1980). When action endangers one's life, such

"supporting characteristics" (Staub, 1980) become crucial. Faith in their own competence and intuition, fearlessness, and high tolerance for risk are among the characteristics of rescuers derived from interviews both with rescuers and with the people they helped (London, 1970; Oliner & Oliner, 1988; Tec, 1986).

Although this is less supported by a body of evidence, it seems that some rescuers were adventurous and pursued risky, dangerous activities in their earlier lives (London, 1970). Adventurousness might reduce the perceived risk and enhance the feeling of competence to help. According to personal goal theory, it may also partly transform the risk to potential satisfaction, adding a source of motivation.

Heroic helpers are not born. An analysis of two specific cases shows the roots and evolution of heroism. The many-faceted influences at work can be seen in the case of Raoul Wallenberg, who saved the lives of tens of thousands of Hungarian Jews (Marton, 1982). Wallenberg was a member of a poor branch of an influential Swedish family. He had wide-ranging travel and work experience and was trained as an architect. In 1944, he was the partner of a Hungarian Jewish refugee in an import-export business. He had traveled to Hungary several times on business, where he visited his partner's relatives. Earlier, while working in a bank in Haifa, he encountered Jewish refugees arriving from Nazi Germany, which was likely to arouse his empathy. In 1944, he seemed restless and dissatisfied with his career.

On his partner's recommendation, Wallenberg was approached by a representative of the American War Refugee Board and asked to go to Hungary as a Swedish diplomat to attempt to save the lives of Hungarian Jews who were then being deported to and killed at Auschwitz. He agreed to go. There was no predominant motive guiding his life at the time, like a valued career, which according to personal goal theory would have reduced his openness to activators of a conflicting motive. The request probably served to focus responsibility on him (Staub, 1978), his connection to his business partner and his partner's relatives enhancing this feeling of responsibility. Familiarity with Hungary and a wide range of past experience in traveling, studying, and working in many places around the world must have added to his feeling of competence. In Hungary, he repeatedly risked his life, subordinating everything to the cause of saving Jewish lives (Marton, 1982).

Wallenberg's commitment seemingly increased over time, although it appears that once he got involved, his motivation to help was immediately high. Another well-known rescuer, Oscar Schindler (Keneally, 1982), clearly progressed along a "continuum of benevolence." He was a German born in Czechoslovakia. In his youth, he raced motorcycles. As a Protestant, he left his village to marry a Catholic girl from another village. Thus, he was doubly marginal and also adventurous. Both his father and his wife were opposed to Hitler. Still, he joined the Nazi Party and followed the

German troops to Poland, where he took over a confiscated factory and, using Jewish slave labor, proceeded to enrich himself.

However, in contrast to others in a similar situation, Schindler responded to the humanity of his slave laborers. From the start, he talked with them and listened to them. He celebrated birthdays with them. He began to help them in small and large ways. In some rescuers, the motivation to help followed witnessing the murder or brutal treatment of a Jew (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). Schindler had a number of such experiences. His actions resulted in two arrests and brief imprisonments from which he freed himself by invoking real and imaginary connections to important Nazis. Both Schindler and Wallenberg possessed considerable personal power and seemed to enjoy exercising this power to save lives.

To protect his slave laborers from the murderous concentration camp Plaszow, Schindler persuaded the Nazis to allow him to build a camp next to his factory. As the Soviet army advanced, Schindler moved his laborers to his hometown, where he created a fake factory that produced nothing, its only purpose to protect the Jewish laborers. In the end, Schindler lost all the wealth he had accumulated in Poland but saved about 1,200 lives.

Like perpetrators and bystanders, heroic helpers evolve. Some of them develop fanatic commitment to their goal (Staub, 1989a). The usual fanatics subordinate themselves to a movement that serves abstract ideals. They come to disregard the welfare and lives of at least some people as they strive to fulfill these ideals. I regard some of the rescuers as "good fanatics," who completely devoted themselves to the *concrete* aim of saving lives.

Probably in every genocide and mass killing there are heroic helpers, but there is a significant body of scholarship only on rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe. In Rwanda, as well, there were Hutus who acted to save Tutsis. A very few spoke out publicly against the killings, and some or perhaps all of these were killed (des Forges, 1999). In 1999, I interviewed a few people who were rescued and one rescuer in Rwanda, enough only to gain some impressions (Staub, 2000; Staub & Pearlman, 2001). Rwanda is a highly religious country, and while some high-level church leaders betrayed the Tutsis and became accomplices to genocide (des Forges, 1999; Gourevitch, 1998; Prunier, 1995), it seems from the reports of those who were rescued that some of the rescuers acted out of religious motives, living up to religious ideals. (Research by Oliner & Oliner [1988] suggested that about 15% of rescuers of Jews acted out of religious motives.) Another impression that came out of the interviews was that perhaps because of the horrible nature of the violence in Rwanda, where in addition to the military and paramilitary groups with many very young members, some people killed neighbors and some

even betrayed members of their own families who had a Tutsi or mixed ethnic background, some of those who were rescued did not trust the motives or character of their rescuers. They could not quite believe that these motives were truly benevolent rather than based on some kind of self-interest.

The research on rescuers of Jews and other information suggest that over time the range of concern of engaged helpers usually expands. For example, the Mothers of the Plaza del Mayo in Argentina began to march in the plaza to protest the disappearances of their own children. They endured persecution, and some were kidnapped. However, as they continued to march, they developed a strong commitment to universal human rights and freedom (Staub, 1989a), a concern about the persecution and suffering of people in general.

THE HEROISM OF SURVIVORS

The heroism of rescuers has slowly come to be known, acknowledged, and celebrated. The heroism of survivors has remained, however, largely unrecognized. Parents, often in the face of impossible odds that can immobilize people, took courageous and determined actions to save their families. Children themselves often showed initiative, judgment, courage, and maturity that greatly exceeded what we normally imagine children to be capable of.

In information I gathered, primarily from child survivors (who were less than 13 years of age when the Holocaust began), in conversations and questionnaires, they described many amazing acts, of their own and of their parents. Parents found ways to hide children, so that they might live even if the parents were killed. Young children lived with an assumed identity, for example, as a Catholic child in a boarding school. One survivor was a seven-year-old child in a hospital. She has already recovered from scarlet fever but to be safe remained in the hospital. There was a raid on the hospital, so she put on clothes that were hidden under her mattress and walked out of the building, through a group of uniformed men, to the house of a friendly neighbor ten blocks away who brought her the clothes in the first place.

Their actions, which saved their own lives and the lives of others, were in turn likely to shape these survivors' personality. It was probably an important source of the capacity of many of them, in spite of the wounds inflicted by their victimization, to lead highly effective lives.[3]

[3] (Summary of material from E. Staub, Another form of heroism: Survivors saving themselves and its impact on their lives. Unpublished manuscript, University of Massachusetts at Amherst. Draft of chapter to appear in O. Feldman and P. Tetlock, *Personality and politics: Essays in honor of Peter Suedfeld*, in preparation).

THE OBLIGATION OF BYSTANDERS

We cannot expect bystanders to sacrifice their lives for others. But we can expect individuals, groups, and nations to act early along a continuum of destruction, when the danger to themselves is limited, and the potential exists for inhibiting the evolution of increasing destructiveness. This will only happen if people – children, adults, whole societies – develop an awareness of their common humanity with other people, as well as of the psychological processes in themselves that turn them against others. Institutions and modes of functioning can develop that embody a shared humanity and make exclusion from the moral realm more difficult. Healing from past victimization (Staub, 1998), building systems of positive reciprocity, creating crosscutting relations (Deutsch, 1973) between groups, and developing joint projects (Pettigrew, 1997) and superordinate goals can promote the evolution of caring and nonaggressive persons and societies (Staub, 1989a, 1992b, 1999a).

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